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Saturday, 21 January 2017 
Graham MacPhee on Trump's Inauguration 
Today I wish to announce a new development at Reflectionsfromdamagedlife, a guest-posting by Graham 
MacPhee on the intellectual implications of Trump's inauguration.  I am delighted that Graham has offered 
this essay to my blog, and I'd encourage any other friends, comrades or interested persons to contact me 






Trump’s Inauguration: What Could Critical Theory 
Learn? 
Guest post by Graham MacPhee 
 
The inauguration of Donald Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States raises immediate 
questions about the current state of democracy and the priorities for political action both within the US 
and beyond. But it might also cause those of us involved in the academic discourse of critical theory to 
reflect on our own theoretical frameworks and assumptions, not least because of the apparent inability of 
contemporary theoretical discourses in the humanities to account for the current predicament. Is there 
anything to be learned for our own theoretical endeavors from the dynamics of social resentment and 
political disenchantment which Trump’s campaign was able to harness, exploit, and channel to such 
effect? 
            Although published a year before the election, I’d suggest that Wendy Brown’s recent 
book Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone, 2015) suggests that there is, even if 
the nature of the election poses significant challenges to her analysis. But for the purposes of addressing 
the theoretical lessons of the Trump’s election, what is remarkable is the extent of her revision of some of 
the basic assumptions of contemporary theory, a revision whose implications, it seems to me, have been 
insufficiently acknowledged or thought through. 
As Brown makes clear, and as reviewers have noted, the book uses but also criticizes Michel 
Foucault’s account of neoliberalism; but the character and implications of Brown’s critique are far beyond 
what we’ve seen in orthodox theory for a long time. Startlingly, given the extent of her indebtedness to 
Foucault, Brown points out that his all-encompassing vision of power is wholly bereft of a conception of 
politics or political action: “there is no political body, no demos acting in concert (even episodically) or 
expressing aspirational sovereignty; there are few social forces from below and no shared powers of rule 
or shared struggles for freedom” (73). Observing that “homo politicus is not a character in Foucault’s 
story” (86), Brown further notes that in constructing his account of neoliberalism, “Foucault averted his 
glance from capital itself as a historical and social force” (75). 
            Reviewers (as far as I can see) have tended to regard these insights as tactical adjustments to a 
theoretical edifice that remains largely intact. But given the extraordinary preeminence accorded to 
Foucault’s notions of governmentality and biopower in the Anglophone academy, I would suggest they 
amount to much more than this. Indeed, in working through the implications of this critique, Undoing the 
Demos significantly revises what might be regarded as the network of unacknowledged assumptions 
that—in the wake of “critical theory” and the “theory wars”—have coalesced as “theory.” 
Most obvious is Brown’s rehabilitation of the “demos” or “people”—presumably not so far away 
from the (non-ethnically defined) people (Volk) that Hegel had identified as locating any formation of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Equally explicit is her retrieval of “freedom” as an open and revisable political 
concept, “precisely the kind of individual and collaborative freedom associated with homo politicus for 
self-rule and rule with others” (110). More obliquely, though unmistakably, Undoing the Demos envisages 
a subjectivity whose cogency far exceeds the dispersal of deconstruction and the passivity of “subject 
position”: rather, it is “the resource for opposing [neoliberalism] with another set of claims and another 
vision of existence” (87; emphasis added). And at a more technical level, but just as challenging for 
contemporary orthodoxy, is her insistence that “capital and capitalism are not reducible to an order of 
reason,” and that “capitalism has drives that no discourse can deny” (75–76). 
Together demos, freedom, and an operative subjectivity allow a critical return to the language of 
the Western philosophical tradition, to the language of “city and soul” (22). The extent of Brown’s rewriting 
of the last three decades of theory in the Anglophone academy is surely remarkable: against the 
dominance of theoretical anti-humanism, she can write without irony of “human striving” as a value (11); 
and against the anti-political language of governmentality, she can affirm that “moral reflection and 
association making—these are the qualities that generate our politicalness” (88). 
            To be quite clear, my intention here is not to accuse Wendy Brown of intellectual bad faith, of 
dodging between positions without owning up to it: indeed, far from it. In my view, Undoing the 
Demos exhibits a refreshing sense of intellectual responsibility in rethinking a theoretical orthodoxy that 
has become manifestly disabling in the face of the deepening political catastrophe of neoliberal 
globalization. Her critical retrieval of the demos, of freedom, of a cogent subjectivity, and of a sense of the 
dynamics of capital that exceed discourse, are intellectually honest responses to a predicament that is 
growing worse daily. And if reviewers have not picked up on the profound nature of her book’s challenge 
to prevailing orthodoxy, that’s hardly her fault. Brown is quite upfront in her critique of Foucault, and if she 
remains tentative about the implications of this critique for reconceiving subjectivity, history, freedom, and 
the shape of democracy, there are perhaps good historical reasons why. 
My point is different. The lesson I take from Undoing the Demos is that we are enjoined to rethink 
our theoretical coordinates in light of the political collapse that confronts us. But in that case, we need to 
be attentive both to the changing shape of our unfolding predicament and to the problems or blockages in 
our own ways of registering and thinking it. The recent election of Donald Trump as president 
(notwithstanding his losing the popular vote) does not, to my mind, square with Brown’s account of the 
absolute subordination of city and soul to the market in neoliberalism. And therefore it requires us to 
reexamine even her remarkable revision of the coordinates of contemporary theory. 
            For all its critique of Foucault’s exclusion of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and therefore 
politics, Undoing the Demos nonetheless reimposes these very same exclusions—but subsequently. 
While the political experience of subjectivity as homo politicus may once have been operative, 
neoliberalism is seen as “a distinctive mode of reason, of the production of subjects” (21) in which homo 
oeconomicus—the register of subjectivity exercised in the market—liquidateshomo politicus, so “undoing 
the demos.” Further, homo oeconomicus is denied the possibility of ever generating a new political 
response, of ever resuscitating homo politicus, since it is now said to have been hollowed out of the 
interest that traditionally drove civil society. “With the ascendency of neoliberalism,” Brown writes, 
“interest has ceased to anchor or characterize homo oeconomicus” (78): and so, she concludes, “homo 
oeconomicus today may no longer have interest at its heart, indeed, may no longer have a heart at all” 
(84). 
Without a heart, the residual homo oeconomicus is bereft of the chaotic and nonidentical striving 
of interest, which means that there is no difference, no nonidentity, between soul, city, and market. The 
economic rationality of “neoliberal reason,” now shorn even of the heart’s self-love, “configures both soul 
and city” without remainder, residue, or nonidentity (27). Which means that the new face of power—
neoliberalism as a mode of rationality—is at once absolute and everywhere, pervading and dominating 
subjectivity, city, and market. 
Brown’s reduction of neoliberalism to an abstract “order of normative reason” (30) thus takes with 
one hand what it gives with the other. If the city is made identical with the market, and the soul, excluded 
from the political, has no heart, then where is the basis of that “moral reflection and association making” 
which “are the qualities that generate our politicalness” (88)? 
            Whatever else might be said of the social dynamics capitalized on by Donald Trump, they cannot 
be accused of being “heartless” in this sense—of lacking the chaotic and nonidentical striving of interest 
and the anger and self-deceit of the heart (see Arlie Hochschild, “I Spent Five Years with Some of 
Trump’s Biggest Fans,” Mother Jones, September/October 2016). Driving the Republicans' massive 
electoral gains in 2016 (and underpinning the staggering irony of the Democratic Party’s rejection of 
Senator Sander’s candidacy) is a significant divergence between popular sentiment and the dominant 
neoliberal accounts of political and economic reality—even if the neoliberal project is the ultimate 
beneficiary. 
However we are to characterize the Republican sweep of presidency, Congress, governorships, 
and state houses in 2016, Brown’s conception of the subordination of soul and city to the abstract 
economic logics of neoliberalism does not work. This outcome happened precisely because market, soul, 
and city are not identical; and equally, this nonidentity could have fostered other outcomes, had the 
political forces squared up differently. Brown’s absolutization of power as neoliberal rationality ignores not 
only the irrationality of this upsurge but also the potency of subjectivity and its responsiveness to the 
dynamics of capital, elements that are by no means inseparable. 
For all its ironies, Trump’s election urgently points to the need to revise many of contemporary 
theory’s orthodoxies and assumptions. Most obviously, the inability to develop a conception of subjectivity 
as plural yet cogent has not only made theory blind to the ways in which the dynamics of subjectivity are 
actually unfolding, but has left it unable to defend and develop public institutions—which emerge through 
the nonidentity of city, soul, and market—that might substantiate a vision of freedom and justice. 
This connection was articulated two decades ago by the British philosopher Gillian Rose in 
her Mourning Becomes Law (Cambridge University Press, 1996): 
The presentation of power as plural yet total and all pervasive, and of opposition to power . . . as the 
anarchic community, unwittingly and unwillingly participates in a restructuring of power which undermines 
those semi-autonomous institutions . . . which alleviate the pressure of the modern state on the individual. 
The plural but total way of conceiving power leaves the individual more not less exposed to the 
unmitigated power of the state. (21) 
Perhaps one lesson we might learn from the contradictory, often irrational, yet also understandable 
dynamics that led to Trump’s election is to recognize how the generalization of difference in abstract 
schemas (discourse, language, power/knowledge, or governmentality) means not only the absolutization 
of power but also the liquidation of the nonidentity of social and political experience upon which any 
alternative politics relies. As Rose had warned, “when a monolithic [and] plural character is attributed to 
power . . . this attribution perpetuates blindness to the reconfiguration of power which we may be 
assisting by our unarticulated characterization of it” (21). 
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